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Abstract
Pursuit of the triple bottom line of economic, community and ecological sustainability has in-
creased the complexity of fishery management; fisheries assessments require new types of
data and analysis to guide science-based policy in addition to traditional biological informa-
tion and modeling. We introduce the Fishery Performance Indicators (FPIs), a broadly
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individual outcome metrics—coded on a 1 to 5 scale based on expert assessment to facili-
tate application to data poor fisheries and sectors—that can be partitioned into sector-
based or triple-bottom-line sustainability-based interpretative indicators. Variation among
outcomes is explained with 54 similarly structured metrics of inputs, management ap-
proaches and enabling conditions. Using 61 initial fishery case studies drawn from industrial
and developing countries around the world, we demonstrate the inferential importance of
tracking economic and community outcomes, in addition to resource status.
Introduction
The tragedy of the commons framework [1–3] has helped explain the decline in global fish
stocks and indicated points of management intervention to facilitate stock rebuilding [4]. How-
ever, the continued struggles of fishing communities to leverage their resources into secure live-
lihoods [5] highlights a second, social tragedy of the commons. World fisheries fall short of
their potential earnings by US$50–80 billion a year (e.g., [6–8]). Losses not only include fore-
gone catch due to overfishing, but also excessive harvest cost, low processing yields, product
waste, and a failure to reach the highest value markets [9]. The result is lost income to small-
scale and industrial harvesters and processors, foregone high quality protein to consumers, and
reduced food and income security for fishing dependent communities in both developed and
developing regions.
Despite the need to understand how to best manage fisheries to capture these benefits, re-
search on global fisheries performance emphasizes the effects of management primarily on
stock and ecological conditions. While fisheries cannot be sustainable with degraded target
stocks, high stock levels will not necessarily lead to an economically healthy industry that can
support the community in which it resides. Even when social conditions are considered, em-
phasis is on those that are correlated with effective stock management [10] rather than on
those that lead to desirable social and economic outcomes such as food security [11].
Resolving this social tragedy requires identifying whether and how fisheries are supporting
the people who participate in them, and understanding how management influences human
outcomes. Sustainable social-ecological systems require a sustainable resource stock, but also
profitable businesses in the harvest and post-harvest sectors, and communities that accept and
support those industries and the people involved in them [12–14]. Much as a sustainable stock
is necessary, so too is social acceptability and continuous business investment.
Accordingly, leading fishery management and development organizations are integrating
economic and community goals alongside stock health, and developing guiding principles that
support the triple-bottom-line (TBL) [15,16]. In the US, the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Con-
servation and Management Act balances National Standard 1 to “prevent overfishing” with
National Standard 8’s mandate to provide for “sustained participation of communities” and
“minimize adverse economic impacts” (16 US Code §1851). Similarly, the EU Common Fisher-
ies Policy provides for “sustainable economic, environmental and social conditions” (CR 2371/
2002 Article 2).
That more groups are articulating these three performance dimensions is a recognition that
the sustainability of fish stocks, fishing industries, and fishing communities are interrelated,
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and that none can provide benefits without the others. The Rockefeller Foundation [17] con-
cludes strategies focusing on “replenishment of fish stocks or conservation of marine biodiver-
sity” have not supported “the success of the industry and as a critical link to poverty
alleviation” in the long term, instead arguing for a “holistic approach” that incorporates eco-
nomic and community outcomes. The Prince’s Charities note that “the fishing sector’s eco-
nomic, environmental and social health can only be guaranteed if we view it in an holistic and
integrated way” ([18] p. 4). The Blue Ribbon Panel [15] emphasizes that “a multidimensional
indicator system . . .needs to be designed as an integral part of the measurement process.” As-
sessing progress toward these three dimensions of sustainability requires understanding the
linkages within the social-ecological systems. Tracking and monitoring only ecosystem-related
outcomes and performance is insufficient for understanding economic and community bene-
fits. However, there is a lack of standard frameworks to measure outcomes on non-biological
dimensions; instead, process implementation or adoption of community approaches to imple-
menting ecological measures often serves as a proxy for advancing social goals (e.g., [19–21]).
Fishery science has gained considerable policy traction by analyzing the biological effects of
alternative approaches to fishery management [4], including co-management (e.g., [10]), catch
shares (e.g., [22,23]), individual transferable quotas (ITQs) (e.g., [24]), and marine protected
areas (MPAs) (e.g., [25,26]). Many of these supporting studies have compiled existing data on
catch volumes and stock health that are measured systematically across large numbers of fish-
eries around the world. These global analyses have influenced the agendas of regulatory agen-
cies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and aid agencies, catalyzing policymakers to
curtail overfishing. Adopting a similar approach for performance of the broader social-ecologi-
cal system poses two significant challenges. First, economic and community factors are ex-
pressed through the political process of management. Social objectives are rarely explicit, vary
widely by fishery [27], and differ by constituency within a fishery; often, there is no consensus
regarding economic or community objectives analogous to preventing collapse or being at the
biomass corresponding to maximum sustainable yield (BMSY) against which to evaluate
social performance.
Second, there is a paucity of data on economic and community performance of individual
fisheries. While most significant stocks—even in developing countries—have some form of
landings data, basic economic data (e.g., ex vessel price) is tracked by regulators in far fewer
fisheries, and supplemented by brokers only in widely traded commodity species. High quality
harvesting cost data is rarely available. Data from the post-harvest sector—which generates
considerable fishery-related employment, income and added value, key elements of economic
and community performance—are almost nonexistent: processing costs and margins are typi-
cally considered proprietary, although they are derived from a public trust resource. Manage-
ment expenditures are budgeted by agency, rather than by fishery. Metrics of community
success are rarely collected outside short-term development investment projects, and even then
are specifically tailored to the individual projects.
Despite these challenges, assessing progress on social-ecological outcomes presents an ur-
gent need for new frameworks to evaluate how management approaches interact with resource,
community and market conditions to not only assure stock health, but also create economic
and community benefits. To meet these needs and challenges, we introduce the Fishery Perfor-
mance Indicators (FPIs), a rapid assessment instrument for measuring the fishery-derived ben-
efits being created not only in the fish stock in the water, but also in the harvest and post-
harvest sectors and fishing communities. They are designed to provide insight into how man-
agement regimes interact with exogenous resource and community factors to affect whether
and to whom benefits accrue.
The Fishery Performance Indicators
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Methods
The FPIs were designed through an iterative, consultative process of extensive piloting and re-
vision. The lead authors developed an initial instrument capturing the key objectives within a
novel structure. With three initial case studies, the draft was reviewed at a two-day workshop
hosted by The International Coalition of Fisheries Associations (ICFA) and The UK Depart-
ment for International Development (DFID), with a panel of development agents and consul-
tants, NGO representatives, academic economists, and global fishing industry participants.
Based on advice received at the workshop, the draft was significantly revised prior to on-the-
ground developing fishery field tests by the authors. The subsequently modified version was pi-
loted by the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) W2004 group of academic economists,
each of whom independently executed a case study based on a (predominantly industrialized)
fishery with which they were familiar. These case studies—and the authors’ experience devel-
oping them—were presented at a one-day workshop where further instrument revisions were
recommended. The World Bank then piloted the instrument with local country consultants in
Indonesia and Philippines, and suggested further improvements through a process that includ-
ed internal and external peer reviews [28]. Finally, all past case studies were updated to the cur-
rent version, and a broader network of case studies was collected through World Bank and
other agency development projects, and through collaboration with additional authors. This
process built confidence among the authors that the instrument was supporting consistent
scoring across the current database of 61 case studies.
The Structure of the FPIs
To address the lack of standardized, reliable data on the social and economic pillars of the TBL,
the FPIs reflect three distinctive structural features. First, rather than attempting to measure a
few indicators with high precision, for each indicator we identify several dimensions of greatest
interest. For each dimension, we then use multiple metrics that capture important aspects of
that dimension using a 1 to 5 scale that can be scored—imprecisely but accurately—based on
expert assessment. The use of discrete bins provides accurate scores by allowing experts to
characterize the metric as being within a broad range, which can be expressed with high confi-
dence, even when precise underlying data is not available. Combining multiple metrics facili-
tates robust dimension scoring in the face of uneven availability of information, fishery expert
certainty or consensus, or metric applicability to a given fishery. Second, we conceptually sepa-
rate dimensions that directly reflect performance on the pillars of the TBL from those that as-
sess enabling environmental conditions, or elements of process that are conjectured to support
outcomes and are therefore often used as proxies for those outcomes. Third, we incorporate
flexibility in the application of the tool by providing two interpretive partitionings of the met-
rics into sets of three indicators. This allows users to aggregate metrics, and weight each com-
ponent indicator, to reflect their individual objectives and priorities.
In both interpretive partitionings, the FPIs are designed to evaluate the performance of fish-
ery management systems. Therefore, the scope of the management system is the primary scale
at which the fishery unit for analysis is defined. This approach contrasts importantly with eco-
logical analyses that focus on individual fish stocks as units for assessment. Many management
systems regulate harvesting activity on multiple stocks, and many stocks are concurrently pur-
sued by multiple groups of harvesters acting under different management rules. Since the effect
of the management system may vary systematically with harvest technologies and the structure
of the supply chain, the definition of fishery for analysis may subdivide the management sys-
tem along fleet, market or jurisdictional lines to capture this heterogeneity, on a case-by-case
The Fishery Performance Indicators
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basis. It is at this level—not the country level or the stock level—at which fishery management
interacts with the integrated socio-ecological system to produce TBL outcomes.
Output Indicators
Fig 1 shows how three indicators of the TBL are constructed using 68 metrics of fishery perfor-
mance that are each coded in levels of 1 to 5, where 5 reflects better metric performance. The
TBL partitioning, with indicators for performance on Ecology, Economics and Community out-
comes, is represented on the far left. The Ecology indicator is captured in a single dimension
composed of a relatively small number of metrics that summarize scientific assessment work,
but with coding guidelines that facilitate accurate scoring based on the information available
where formal stock assessments do not exist.
The Economics indicator measures whether the fishery is effectively generating market bene-
fits and is reflected in six distinct dimensions. The Harvest dimension captures landings and
revenue levels, and whether rent is dissipated through inefficiencies of excess capacity or der-
bies. Economic gains accumulate within the harvest sector through vessel profits and the value
of permits, and to the post-harvest sector in the form of processing capital; these are captured
in the Harvest Assets and Post-Harvest Assets dimensions. The Risk dimension captures several
sources of volatility that affect business value. Finally, the Trade and Product Form dimensions
assess the extent to which the product is reaching markets that yield the greatest
potential profit.
The Community indicator captures the extent to which the fishery contributes to livelihoods
and other benefits within its community. First, theManagerial Returns dimension assesses the
fishery benefits accruing to boat captains, permit holders, and processing owners and manag-
ers; these earnings metrics are locally scaled, to place the livelihoods in the context of local op-
portunities and standards. The Labor Returns dimension similarly measures the scaled
earnings, opportunity costs, and social status of harvesting crew and processing workers. Col-
lectively, this reflects not only the relative level of income, but also the importance of the fishery
to the community as part of its economy or culture, and the extent to which participants have
sufficient voice within the community to ensure resources and support for effective manage-
ment will sustain the fishery. By separately measuring capital owners and workers in each sec-
tor, the FPIs can identify to whom direct fishery wealth is accruing, and whether it is doing so
in accordance with management goals [29]. Because labor earnings are measured relative to
other occupations in the region available to those with comparable skill, cross-sectional varia-
tion in management can associate outcome differences between fishing and non-fishing sectors
with features of the management system [30].
The Health and Sanitation dimension captures the health and safety environment of each
group of stakeholders. A successful fishery will support the provision of benefits to the broader
community, including education and other economic activity, captured in the Community Sup-
port Services dimension. The Local Ownership dimension scores the amount of harvesting and
processing capital that is owned by nonresidents, while the Local Labor dimension measures
the amount of employment on boats and in processing plants that is obtained by nonresidents,
together capturing the extent to which fishery wealth stays within the community. Lastly, the
Career dimension captures whether the fishery is generating stable, long-term employment
for participants.
The individual metrics that comprise these indicators are regrouped in an alternative parti-
tioning, represented on the far right of Fig 1, with indicators for Stock Performance, Harvest
Sector Performance and Post-Harvest Sector Performance. This sector-based partitioning is use-
ful for describing distributional outcomes and for potential investors in different segments of
The Fishery Performance Indicators
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Fig 1. Schematic of the Output Indicators and the Associated Dimensions and Metrics.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0122809.g001
The Fishery Performance Indicators
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the fishery. The braiding shows how individual metrics are mapped into the dimensions of
each indicator: in general, theHarvest Sector Performance and Post-Harvest Sector Performance
indicators draw metrics from the Community and Economics indicators. TheHarvest Asset and
Risk dimensions map directly toHarvest Sector Performance dimensions, as does Harvest with
the addition of the Safety metric. The Owners, Permit Holders and Captains dimension cap-
tures the earnings, community standing, and quality of life of those holding the capital needed
to access to the fishery, while the Crew dimension represents the same information for people
who work in harvesting but depend on others for access.
The Post-Harvest Sector Performance indicator dimensions map Trade and Product Form to
Market Performance and Post-Harvest Asset Performance, respectively, and Post-Harvest Assets
into Post-Harvest Processing & Support Industry Performance with the addition of the Support
Industry metric. The Processing Owners and Managers dimension captures the earnings, com-
munity standing, and quality of life of those making processing decisions, while the Processing
Workers dimension represents the same information for people employed in
processing facilities.
Enabling Factors
To avoid conflating observed benefits with conditions or management regimes conjectured to
support them, we separately identify 15 dimensions of enabling factors, reflecting five input
components (Fig 2). The 54 constituent metrics capture management descriptors and exoge-
nous enabling conditions that may affect output indicator scores. This list mirrors the empiri-
cal framework used for resource self-governance (e.g., [31–34]) by positing a link between a set
of exogenous enabling conditions and management success. We extend that framework by
specifying interrelated, but independent, ecological, economic and community indicators as
the specific measurable notions of success. We also incorporate a broader set of enabling condi-
tions to capture alternative management structures that can be evaluated to provide insight
about management systems that are effective when enabling conditions for self-governance are
not present.
Selecting a tractable and credible set of enabling factors to include is challenging since the
fisheries management literature discusses many approaches, each supported by case studies of
non-randomized (and nearly always successful by some measure) implementations. Some
focus exclusively on technical measures (MPAs, gear innovations, TACs), others on the social
institutions surrounding the resource (self-governance, property rights systems); all are influ-
enced by macroeconomic, infrastructure and resource conditions. We draw on the highest pro-
file mechanisms in the literature to associate measures across a broad cross section of fisheries
in order to understand when each method is most effective. Dimensions and corresponding
metrics are anchored in competing theories of fishery management, with the intent of testing
their causal or conditional effects; it is not implied that higher input scores lead to higher out-
put performance, or that effects are monotonic within metrics or linear across metrics.
TheMacro Factors component of inputs reflects the institutional state of the country or re-
gion being evaluated. The General Environmental Performance dimension captures the condi-
tion of the environment at the national level [35], while the Exogenous Environmental Factors
dimension identifies local levels of disease, pollution (both chronic and shocks) and natural di-
sasters that may affect an individual fishery (e.g., [35–38]). In the Governance and Economic
Conditions dimensions, national indicators reflect how much control individual citizens can
exercise over social distributional decisions and resource management. High scores will reflect
fisheries where participants can influence allocations, governance and enforcement to create
The Fishery Performance Indicators
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Fig 2. Schematic of the Input Components and the Associated Dimensions and Metrics.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0122809.g002
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more income, and interact freely in the market to encourage strong and sustainable partner-
ships among communities and businesses [27].
The Property Rights & Responsibility component reflects how much and what type of con-
trol individuals can exercise over the resource, and how much opportunity they have to estab-
lish and protect well-designed resource management structures. Many economists believe such
rights to be critical to creating economically sustainable fisheries. The Fishing Access Rights di-
mension captures the nature and strength of the harvesters’ rights to exclude others from using
the resource through limited access [39,40]. The Harvest Rights dimension captures the nature
and strength of harvesters’ individual, or collective, rights to a specific quantity of the harvest
[41].
The Co-management component measures the role that local stakeholders play in determin-
ing the management of the fishery, reflecting evidence that (even in the absence of strong na-
tional enforcement), local communities can improve outcomes or resolve the tragedy of the
commons through cooperation [32,42]. The Collective Action dimension reflects the extent to
which harvesters act as a group to manage the resource and support sustainable practices in
place of rent dissipating ones. The Participation dimension measures the extent to which stake-
holders are involved in crafting management, which makes management more effective [43] or
increases compliance [44,45]. Other research suggests social features of the community con-
tribute to co-management effectiveness, so Leadership and Social Cohesion metrics are includ-
ed in the Community dimension [10,32]. Fishery management often affects the balance of
power in households in a way that is either a concern of policymakers [46,47], or supports bet-
ter outcomes [48], so the Gender dimension is included to reflect the role that women have in
harvest and post-harvest activities.
TheManagement component considers how well the management system works to gather
information, both from science and stakeholders, and integrate it into policymaking. TheMan-
agement Inputs dimension reflects the state of enforcement efforts [49], extent of shared stock
(e.g., [50]), the level of subsidies [51], and the amount of fishery income that is expended sim-
ply managing the fishery. Greater management resources may improve the understanding of
fish stocks and lead to better management and larger sustainable harvests. In order to capture
the role of quantitative analysis in management success, the Data dimension measures how fre-
quently and to what extent data is collected and analyzed in order to set management targets
[52]. TheManagement Methods dimension measures the application of alternative approaches
to management, including MPAs [53], spatial management [54], and TACs [55,56]. All have
been posited to improve ecological and economic outcomes, although further research is neces-
sary to determine how such strategies interact with one-another, and other environmental and
institutional enabling factors.
The Post-Harvest component reflects the extent to which a region has the economic and
physical infrastructure available to enable the generation of sustainable livelihoods. TheMar-
kets & Market Institutions dimension captures the opportunities to generate income through
sales of the fishery products, through competitive ex-vessel pricing [57–59] and through barri-
ers to international high-value markets [60]. Under some conditions, access to high-value buy-
ers through freely flowing competitive markets are critical to receiving the best prices [61], but
in others access to these markets can be an avenue to exploitation [62]. The Infrastructure di-
mension captures the state of the technology that may enable improvements in product quality
or product development, or allow access to higher value buyers.
The Fishery Performance Indicators
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Metric Structure
Each of the metrics that comprise the output and input dimensions is assigned a score between
1 and 5 following criteria established for each score level. For output metrics, the level descrip-
tors were chosen so that higher scores reflect better performance, with levels capturing (pro-
jected) quintiles or key performance benchmarks across global fisheries; we interpret a 3 as a
level below which improvement could be considered. For input metrics, level descriptors were
chosen to be monotonic, without presumption that higher scores are better or lead to mono-
tonically higher output scores; endpoint scores sometimes capture extremes important for test-
ing hypotheses in the literature (e.g., strong property rights) rather than quintiles. For a few
metrics, quintile cutpoints can be established from extant global data (e.g., country-fishery
landings in FISHSTAT Plus [63] was used for Annual Landings Volatility). However, for most
metrics, standard data across fisheries does not exist, or it would be impossible to develop simi-
larly scaled calculations across the range of case studies. For these, we drew on the extensive ex-
perience of our authors to develop qualitative descriptions of levels that capture rough
quintiles or key benchmarks of performance across global fisheries, recasting and refining
them through the pilot process.
Scoring the resulting metrics requires a basic set of data on the fishery that should be avail-
able in all significant fisheries (e.g., landings volumes and approximate prices), and local expert
assessment of qualitative indicator levels. Metrics emphasize the current status of the fishery,
some relative to the recent past. We avoid forecasts or sustainability estimates because data,
analysis, and political processes across the range of fisheries do not support accurate projec-
tions about the status of fisheries in the future; instead, the rapid assessment nature of the FPIs
facilitates repeat application that directly measures future conditions, and the role of manage-
ment in determining them.
As an example, Table 1 shows the score descriptors for the Crew Earnings Compared to Re-
gional Average Earningsmetric; a more detailed description and scoring guidance with exam-
ples is given in the FPI manual (see S2 Supplemental Information). In the absence of primary
data from surveys of fishermen and non-fishermen about their incomes, the scoring structure
allows accurate coding: it asks the scorer to assess whether crew earnings are about the same as
other jobs available in the region, a little better or worse, or a lot better or worse. With similar
questions for harvester sector capital owners, processing owners, and processing workers,
scores can be compared across groups to assess how rents are distributed within the fishery,
and if various fishing jobs are desirable relative to other work in the community.
In addition to the raw scores, each FPI metric score is also given a quality rating to reflect
the scorer’s degree of certainty about the score assigned. An ‘A’ rating is given if the scorer is
Table 1. Scoring Criteria for theCrew Earnings Compared to Regional Average EarningsMetric of the
Labor ReturnsDimension of theCommunity Indicator.
Earnings Compared to
Regional Average
Earnings
• 5: More than 50% above
the regional average;
Ratio of annual earnings from ﬁshing per crew
member to the regional average earnings. In
many cases, the captain is an owner of a vessel
or permit, but in other cases, captains are
considered as crew. Crew is deﬁned as those
depending on others for access.
• 4: Between 10 and 50%
above regional average;
• 3: Within 10% of the
regional average;
• 2: Between 50% and
90% of the regional
average;
• 1: Less than half of the
regional average
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0122809.t001
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highly confident that the score is correct; a ‘B’ if the scorer is highly confident the true score is
within one bin of the given score; and a ‘C’ reflects an educated guess about which the scorer is
not able to be highly confident (see S1 Appendix). While reliable quantitative data will support
calculations that lead to high confidence, high confidence can also come through the scorer’s
extensive experience with the fishery or scoring descriptors that make a change between levels
very unlikely.
Comparison Sets
An essential element of the FPIs approach is to focus on defining scores from the perspective of
the decision-making agent. For example, incomes are scored relative to the earner’s economic
sphere and opportunity; investment risk and capital cost are assessed relative to other accessi-
ble capital sources. For some fisheries, these markets are well-functioning and international,
but for many, these markets are local and poorly integrated with the broader national or
global economy.
Results
Fig 3 shows the locations and summary performance on the three TBL indicators of our 61
case studies from around the world, for fisheries ranging from of small freshwater village fish-
eries in Bangladesh to the highly industrialized fisheries operating in the North Pacific. Ecology
scores are higher in the developed countries that dominate the high-latitude case studies, com-
pared to the developing countries that dominate the equatorial sample. Economics scores have
fewer high (green; very well performing) scores than does Ecology, even where fisheries are well
managed, with a mix of yellow (well performing) and red (in need of improvement) across
much of the world. Community outcomes have far fewer low (red) scores than either Economics
or Ecology, and many green outcomes throughout the world, including in developing fisheries
where Ecology and Economics outcomes are middling or low. Within fisheries, the TBL indica-
tor scores are imperfectly correlated and there are very few fisheries whose scores place them
within the same bin for each pillar of the TBL.
The selected case studies are best described as an opportunity sample, with developed coun-
try case studies included because one of the academic or agency co-authors was willing to com-
plete the instrument, and developing country case studies included through author
connections or World Bank involvement. As such, tractable developing country fisheries are
oversampled since, as a lending organization, the World Bank choses projects where it expects
the country will be able to repay the investment from increased revenue created by the invest-
ment. However, these cases are informative because they represent the range of fisheries in
which investment in management change has the potential to generate social and ecological
benefits, including poverty alleviation.
Fig 4 lists the individual fisheries and the base year of their scoring, along with their un-
weighted scores for both the TBL indicators and sector indicators; rankings weighted by metric
quality score are statistically indistinguishable (see S1 Appendix). Fisheries prosecuted by de-
veloped countries are highlighted in the left column. The case studies are sorted by perfor-
mance on the Ecology indicator.
The ecological rankings are consistent with expectations: well managed fisheries, predomi-
nantly in the US and Europe and some certified by groups such as Marine Stewardship Council
(MSC), rank near the top; open access developing country fisheries, along with prominent ex-
amples of overfished industrial fisheries such as New England groundfish circa 2008, rank near
the bottom. Therefore, the discrete bin-based scoring system captures and aggregates variance
in the data consistent with more precise assessments of the same fisheries.
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Fig 3. Map of Case Studies. Dot colors represent each case study fishery’s performance on Ecology (top), Economic (middle) andCommunity
(bottom) indicators.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0122809.g003
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The results of the other indicators validate the concerns that motivated the development of
the FPIs. Although the Economic and Community indicators are not uncorrelated with the
Ecology indicator (in fact, a Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney rank sum test does not reject the hy-
pothesis of identical rankings of the fisheries by indicator), we observe dramatic and frequent
exceptions suggesting that ecology represents an unsatisfactory proxy for the other pillars of
the TBL: each bottom line indicator must be monitored separately.
The case studies contain both socially successful fisheries based on depleted resources, and
healthy resources that do not support high social outcomes. Economically low-performing but
ecologically healthy fisheries occur where resources are abundant relative to market demand or
where biologically effective management is in place, but management presents poor incentives
for generating market return or minimizing cost. Striking examples include the MSC-certified
Alaskan salmon and Oregon Dungeness crab derby fisheries, where revenues are spent on ex-
cess harvest capital and short seasons lead to supply gluts and low prices.
The Kenyan octopus and Seychellois sea cucumber fisheries, on the other hand, both have
depleted resources but contribute significantly to their communities. In these cases, the export
products command prices that are able to provide strong livelihoods and contribute to their
communities, despite being poorly managed. One contributing factor is that overall lower stan-
dards of living mean that even relatively low levels of benefits from fishing can make partici-
pants well off compared to their non-fishing peers, and able to contribute meaningfully to the
local economy. Another is that the fisheries may be in the process of being depleted and that in-
frastructure, reputations and perceptions established during this high-rent fishing-down phase
persist as harvest levels fall; repeat application of the FPIs will illuminate which of these bene-
fits of initial high levels of fishing are permanent and which are transient.
In addition to validating the need to track Economic and Community performance to
complement ecological performance, the FPIs also were motivated by the need to capture the
effects of the post-harvest sector. Overlooking this sector omits an important source of poten-
tial local and community benefits from fisheries—which can often exceed those from the har-
vest sector—and a constituency for supporting and implementing advantageous changes in
fishery management [64]. Comparing the Post-Harvest Sector Performance indicator in the sec-
tor partitioning, we find that it deviates importantly from both the Stock Performance indicator
and theHarvest Sector Performance indicator. This can occur as management strategies or
market structure affect the division of rents between the harvest and post-harvest sectors. In
many export fisheries, such as the Kenyan octopus and the Seychellois sea cucumber fisheries
mentioned above, the Post-Harvest Sector Performance score is considerably higher than the
Harvest Sector Performance score, as exporting considerably increases product value and the
small number of exporters are able to capture much of the value they create. In New England
groundfish, although there are a large number of dealers, they are less overcapitalized than the
harvesters and thus account for much of the net economic benefit in the fishery. Broadly, cases
where the post-harvest sector does worse than the harvest sector are those fisheries where pro-
cessing consists mostly of preservation (smoking or drying) for consumption in local, low-
value markets.
Fig 5 presents the average score of each dimension of the TBL partitioning, separated by de-
veloping and developed country fisheries. The stocks in our developed country case studies are
about one score level higher than those in developing countries, reflecting the distribution of
Fig 4. Fishery Performance Indicator Scores for 61 Global Case Studies.Case studies from countries
with per capita GDP above the global median are shaded, and scores are color coded by performance
(green = high; red = low).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0122809.g004
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those cases in Fig 4. Perhaps surprisingly, developed country fisheries do not outperform on all
dimensions: returns to capital owners are a level higher than laborers, but are equivalently
good jobs—on average and relative to local standards—across developed and developing coun-
try fisheries. Similarly, developing countries are more likely to use local labor, and for a greater
portion of working life, than developed country fisheries that attract immigrant labor at lower
wages than local workers will accept.
The indicators reflect that developed countries offer better community services, generally at-
tributable to more diverse economies, but also reveal where and how their fisheries generate
more benefits. Developed country harvests, and harvest and post-harvest assets, outperform
those in developing countries, reflecting that both the harvesting and processing sectors are
creating more wealth from their fishery resources. They transform harvested fish into higher
value products—nearly a one score level difference—and exceed developing countries at trade
by more than a score level, creating value by selling products to those willing to pay the most
for them.
These performance differences are associated with enabling condition disparities of nearly 2
levels in the strength of the national economies, infrastructure, governance and general envi-
ronmental regulatory performance, not surprising as descriptors of the difference between de-
veloped and developing countries. While more case studies and repeated observations are
needed to draw causal inferences, there are also differences in fisheries management: while
scores on stakeholder participation dimensions are similar, there are large gaps in the resources
for management, data collection and analysis, and the implementation of management tools,
especially the strength of access rights.
Fig 6 reports the score quality metadata reported by case study authors, averaged by dimen-
sion of the Sector partitioning (see S1 Appendix for metric-specific averages). These scores re-
veal a surprisingly small difference between the developed and developing country fisheries.
The largest gap is on the Risk dimension, which ideally would be scored based on calculations
with systematically collected time series of price and landings data; the gap reflects that devel-
oping countries often lack this data (and experience does not provide confidence on variance).
It is noteworthy that in the postharvest sector, even in developed countries, many of the
Fig 5. Average Triple Bottom Line FPI Scores. TBL input (left panel) and output dimensions (right panel), by developed (red) and developing
(blue) country.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0122809.g005
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dimensions fall to ‘B’ information quality—typical of developing countries on many dimen-
sions—because it is a data-poor sector, often neglected in fishery management evaluation de-
spite being a source of considerable benefits. Assessors of developing country fisheries were
able to score their inputs with the same degree of confidence as those in developed countries.
Discussion
The FPIs are a tool for identifying management strategies that work under combinations of ex-
ogenous circumstances when the goal is not merely stock sustainability, but also to generate
economic and community benefits from fishery resources. Analysis of 61 global case studies,
drawn from an opportunity sample of developed and developing country fisheries, reveal the
importance of measuring the elements of the TBL separately, rather than focusing on one and
expecting a direct correlation with others. Further, the FPIs are able to assess data-poor fisher-
ies—and sectors—with sufficient confidence and consistency to capture meaningful variation
in performance among fisheries.
Adding dimensions to benchmarking and performance assessment is burdensome, and
strains the disciplinary and sectoral expertise, as well as capacity, of assessors. Similarly, there
are limitations and challenges associated with using expert assessments as a proxy for data
(e.g., [65]). Therefore, there is and will continue to be a role for detailed case studies, but there
are important uses for broad rapid assessment tools that can be applied simply and quickly by
experienced experts with a range of backgrounds in nearly any fishery. We envision application
by academics, local fishery managers, fishery researchers, and development agents and consul-
tants, contributing to a large reference base of panel data. The FPIs’ strategy of foregoing preci-
sion (but not accuracy) for rapid assessment of individual fisheries facilitates the assembly of a
large-N data set, which is a well-recognized challenge in the literature on the commons [66].
Further, by clearly delineating measures of performance and enabling factors, it provides a lexi-
con that can be used flexibly in linking different notions of success with concrete measures.
The FPIs can serve several roles and different audiences. Harvesters and processors in a fish-
ery can use the FPIs to compare their performance with similar fisheries around the world to
identify specific sources of foregone wealth and food security in their own fisheries, and to es-
tablish predicates for improvement. Suppliers and retailers who engage in international seafood
Fig 6. Average Sector FPI Score Quality Ratings. Sector output (left panel) and enabling factor (right panel) dimensions, by developed (pink) and
developing (light blue) countries.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0122809.g006
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trade can draw on the FPIs to identify fisheries where not just ecology and biological manage-
ment aspects of the fishery are considered sustainable, but so is the local industry, assuring a
supply stream that is reliable, high-quality and justifiable to consumers. The FPIs also provide
a framework for investors and bankers to identify fisheries with high potential for return and
low risk associated with improper management or dysfunctional communities.
For international development agencies, the FPIs can assist in identifying fisheries that are
not meeting their potential as a platform for supporting local economic development that im-
proves standards of living and alleviates poverty. Within those fisheries, it will illuminate spe-
cific dimensions where improvement is needed. While individual projects have specific
objectives that need to be benchmarked and monitored in greater detail, over the course of a
project the FPIs are an off-the-shelf low-resource requirement accountability tool with which
progress across the TBL can be tracked, and compared to contemporaneous progress in other
countries that did not receive the investment, or received different interventions. For support-
ing NGOs, the FPIs can provide data for their stakeholder outreach and political action materi-
als and enhance the knowledge base of their contributors.
As a research tool to support science-based policy, the FPIs establish a common baseline
dataset on global communities, management and success, supporting the development of nu-
anced, empirically-based models relating institutions and practices to outcomes. While previ-
ous global cross-sectional studies of fishery management have focused at the country level (e.g.,
[11,67]), the FPIs’ strategy of assessing individual fisheries—and the ability to reassess fisheries
rapidly to produce panel data—will eventually provide a mechanism for understanding the
causal and supporting relationships between each notion of success represented by the triad of
outcome indicators, and the prevailing enabling conditions and alternative resource
management strategies.
This tool capitalizes on concurrent fishery-to-fishery variation in management strategies
and enabling conditions to provide hundreds of natural experiments in alternative manage-
ment structures that can be used to draw lessons from successful fisheries to those that are not
supporting their stakeholders or communities. Many leading hypotheses may be testable based
on FPI data alone, and others that emerge can be tested by supplementing the FPI framework
for specific fisheries. Additional indicators of sociological or ecological variables, perhaps re-
quiring more detailed data collection, could also be merged for a subset of countries, allowing
testing of additional hypotheses. With additional case studies, outcomes can be linked with
context and management, and we can identify science-based strategies that capture the wealth
the oceans have the potential to provide.
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